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Abstract
Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic the-
ory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by ‘holism’.
For this purpose I propose an epistemological criterion to decide whether or not a
physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if it is
impossible in principle to infer the global properties, as assigned in the theory, by
local resources available to an agent. I propose that these resources include at least
all local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with
the well-known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. The criterion for
holism proposed here involves a shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology.
I apply this epistemological criterion to classical physics and Bohmian mechanics
as represented on a phase and configuration space respectively, and for quantum
mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quan-
tum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I
provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum me-
chanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no
entanglement is needed.
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1 Introduction
Holism is often taken to be the idea that the whole is more than the sum of the
parts. Because of being too vague, this idea has only served as a guideline or
intuition to various sharper formulations of holism. Here I shall be concerned
with the one relevant to physics, i.e., the doctrine of metaphysical holism,
which is the idea that properties or relations of a whole are not determined or
cannot be determined by intrinsic properties or relations of the parts 1 . This is
taken to be opposed to a claim of supervenience (Healey, 1991), to reduction-
ism (Maudlin, 1998), to local physicalism (Teller, 1986), and to particularism
(Teller, 1989). In all these cases a common approach is used to define what
metaphysical holism is: via the notion of supervenience 2 . According to this
common approach metaphysical holism is the doctrine that some facts, prop-
erties, or relations of the whole do not supervene on intrinsic properties and
relations of the parts, the latter together making up the supervenience basis.
As applied to physical theories, quantum mechanics is then taken to be the
paradigmatic example of a holistic theory, since certain composite states (i.e.,
entangled states) do not supervene on subsystem states, a feature not found
in classical physical theories.
However, in this paper I want to critically review the supervenience approach
to holism and propose a new criterion for deciding whether or not a phys-
ical theory is holistic. The criterion for whether or not a theory is holistic
proposed here is an epistemological one. It incorporates the idea that each
physical theory (possibly supplemented with a property assignment rule via
an interpretation) has the crucial feature that it tells us how to actually infer
1 This metaphysical holism (also called property holism) is to be contrasted with
explanatory and meaning holism (Healey, 1991). The first is the idea that explana-
tion of a certain behavior of an object cannot be given by analyzing the component
parts of that object. Think of consciousness of which some claim that it cannot
be fully explained in terms of physical and chemical laws obeyed by the molecules
of the brain. The second is the idea that the meaning of a term cannot be given
without regarding it within the full context of its possible functioning and usage in
a language.
2 The notion of supervenience, as used here, is meant to describe a particular re-
lationship between properties of a whole and properties of the parts of that whole.
The main intuition behind what particular kind of relationship is meant, is cap-
tured by the following impossibility claim. It is not possible that two things should
be identical with respect to their subvenient or subjacent properties (i.e., the lower-
level properties), without also being identical with respect to their supervening or
upper-level properties. The first are the properties of the parts, the second are those
of the whole. The idea is that there can be no relevant difference in the whole with-
out a difference in the parts. (Cleland (1984) uses a different definition in terms of
modal logic.)
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properties of systems and subsystems.
The guiding idea of the approach here suggested, is that some property of a
whole would be holistic if, according to the theory in question, there is no way
we can find out about it using only local means, i.e., by using only all possible
non-holistic resources available to an agent. In this case, the parts would not
allow for inferring the properties of the whole, not even via all possible subsys-
tem property determinations that can be performed, and consequentially we
would have some instantiation of holism, called epistemological holism. The
set of non-holistic resources is called the resource basis. I propose that this
basis includes at least all local operations and classical communication of the
kind the theory in question allows for.
The approach suggested here thus focuses on property measurement instead
of on the supervenience of properties. It can be viewed as a shift from on-
tology to epistemology 3 and also as a shift that takes into account the full
potential of physical theories by including what kind of property inferences or
measurements are possible according to the theory in question. The claim I
make is that these two approaches are crucially different and that each have
their own merits. I show the fruitfulness of the new approach by illustrating
it in classical physics, Bohmian mechanics and orthodox quantum mechanics.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First I will present in section 2 a
short review of the supervenience approach to holism. I especially look at the
supervenience basis used. To illustrate this approach I consider what it has to
say about classical physics and quantum mechanics. Here I rigorously show
that in this approach classical physics is non-holistic and furthermore that the
orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is deemed holistic. In the next
section (section 3) I will give a different approach based on an epistemological
stance towards property determination within physical theories. This approach
is contrasted with the approach of the previous section and furthermore argued
to be a very suitable one for addressing holism in physical theories.
In order to show its fruitfulness I will apply the epistemological approach to
different physical theories. Indeed, in section 4 classical physics and Bohmian
mechanics are proven not to be epistemologically holistic, whereas the ortho-
dox interpretation of quantum mechanics is shown to be epistemologically
holistic without making appeal to the feature of entanglement, a feature that
was taken to be absolutely necessary in the supervenience approach for any
holism to arise in the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally
3 This difference is similar to the difference between the two alternative definitions
of determinism. From an ontological point of view, determinism is the existence of
a single possible future for every possible present. Alternatively, from an epistemo-
logical point of view, it is the possibility in principle of inferring the future from the
present.
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in section 5 I will recapitulate, and argue this new approach to holism to be
a fruit of the rise of the new field of quantum information theory.
2 Supervenience approaches to holism
The idea that holism in physical theories is opposed to supervenience of prop-
erties of the whole on intrinsic properties or relations of the parts, is worked
out in detail by Teller (1986) and by Healey (1991), although others have used
this idea as well, such as French (1989) 4 , Maudlin (1998) and Esfeld (2001).
I will review the first two contributions in this section.
Before discussing the specific way in which part and whole are related, Healey
(1991) clears the metaphysical ground of what it means for a system to be
composed out of parts, so that the whole supervenience approach can get off
the ground. I take this to be unproblematic here and say that a whole is com-
posed if it has component parts. Using this notion of composition, holism is
the claim that the whole has features that cannot be reduced to features of
its component parts. Both Healey (1991) and Teller (1986) use the same kind
of notion for the reduction relation, namely supervenience. However, whereas
Teller only speaks about relations of the whole and non-relational properties
of the parts, Healey uses a broader view on what features of the whole should
supervene on what features of the parts. Because of its generality I take essen-
tially Healey’s definition to be paradigmatic for the supervenience approach
to holism 5 . In this approach, holism in physical theories means that there are
physical properties or relations of the whole that are not supervenient on the
intrinsic physical properties and relations of the component parts. An essential
feature of this approach is that the supervenience basis, i.e., the properties or
relations on which the whole may or may not supervene, are only the intrinsic
ones, which are those which the parts have at the time in question in and out
of themselves, regardless of any other individuals.
We see that there are three different aspects involved in this approach. The
4 French (1989) uses a slightly different approach to holism where supervenience is
defined in terms of modal logic, following a proposal by Cleland (1984). However,
for the present purposes, this approach leads essentially to the same results and I
will not discuss it any further.
5 The exact definition by Healey (1991, p.402) is as follows. ‘Pure physical holism:
There is some set of physical objects from a domain D subject only to processes
of type P , not all of whose qualitative, intrinsic physical properties and relations
are supervenient upon the qualitative, intrinsic physical properties and relations of
their basic physical parts (relative to D and P )’. The definition by Teller (1986)
is a restriction of this definition to solely relations of the whole and intrinsic non-
relational properties of the parts.
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first has to do with the metaphysical, or ontological effort of clarifying what
it means that a whole is composed out of parts. I took this to be unprob-
lematic. The second aspect gives us the type of dependence the whole should
have to the parts in order to be able to speak of holism. This was taken to be
supervenience. Thirdly, and very importantly for the rest of this paper, the
supervenience basis needs to be specified because the supervenience criterion
is relativized to this basis. Healey (1991, p.401) takes this basis to be ‘just the
qualitative, intrinsic properties and relations of the parts, i.e., the properties
and relations that these bear in and out of themselves, without regard to any
other objects, and irrespective of any further consequences of their bearing
these properties for the properties of any wholes they might compose.’ Simi-
larly Teller (1986, p.72) uses ‘properties internal to a thing, properties which
a thing has independently of the existence or state of other objects.’
Although the choice of supervenience basis is open to debate because it is
hard to specify precisely, the idea is that we should not add global properties
or relations to this basis. It is supposed to contain only what we intuitively
think to be non-holistic. However, as I aim to show in the next sections, an
alternative basis exists to which a criterion for holism can be relativized. This
alternative basis, the resource basis as I call it, arises when one adopts a dif-
ferent view when considering physical theories. For such theories allow not
only for presenting us with an ontological picture of the world (although pos-
sibly only after an interpretation is provided), but also they allow for specific
forms of property assignment and property determination. The idea then is
that these latter processes, such as measurement or classical communication,
have intuitively clear non-holistic features, which allow for an epistemological
analysis of whether or not a whole can be considered to be holistic or not.
However, before presenting this new approach, I discuss how the supervenience
approach treats classical physics and quantum mechanics (in the orthodox
interpretation). In treating these two theories I will first present some general
aspects related to the structure of properties these theories allow for, since
they are also needed in future sections.
2.1 Classical physics in the supervenience approach
Classical physics assigns two kinds of properties to a system. State indepen-
dent or fixed properties that remain unchanged (such as mass and charge)
and dynamical properties associated with quantities called dynamical vari-
ables (such as position and momentum) (Healey, 1991). It is the latter we are
concerned with in order to address holism in a theory since these are subject to
the dynamical laws of the theory. Thus in order to ask whether or not classical
physics is holistic we need to specify how parts and wholes get assigned the
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dynamical properties in the theory 6 . This ontological issue is unproblematic
in classical physics, for it views objects as bearers of determinate properties
(both fixed and dynamical ones). The epistemological issue of how to gain
knowledge of these properties is treated via the idea of measurement. A mea-
surement is any physical operation by which the value of a physical quantity
can be inferred. Measurement reveals this value because it is assumed that
the system has the property that the quantity in question has that value at
the time of measurement. In classical physics there is no fundamental dif-
ference between measurement and any other physical process. Isham (1995,
p.57) puts it as follows: ‘Properties are intrinsically attached to the object
as it exists in the world, and measurement is nothing more than a particular
type of physical interaction designed to display the value of a specific quan-
tity.’ The bridge between ontology and epistemology, i.e., between property
assignment (for any properties to exist at all (in the theory)) and property
inference (to gain knowledge about them), is an easy and unproblematic one
called measurement.
The specific way the dynamical properties of an object are encoded in the for-
malism of classical physics is in a state space Ω of physical states x of a system.
This is a phase space where at each time a unique state x can be assigned to
the system. Systems or ensembles can be described by pure states which are
single points x in Ω or by mixed states which are unique convex combinations
of the pure states. The set of dynamical properties determines the position of
the system in the phase space Ω and conversely the dynamical properties of the
system can be directly determined from the coordinates of the point in phase
space. Thus, a one-to-one correspondence exists between systems and their
dynamical properties on the one hand, and the mathematical representation
in terms of points in phase space on the other. Furthermore, with observation
of properties being unproblematic, the state corresponds uniquely to the out-
comes of the (ideal) measurements that can be performed on the system. The
specific property assignment rule for dynamical properties that captures the
above is the following.
A physical quantity A is represented by a function A : Ω→ R such that A(x)
is the value A possesses when the state is x. To the property that the value
of A lies in the real-valued interval ∆ there is associated a Borel-measurable
subset
ΩA∈∆ = A−1{∆} = {x ∈ Ω|A(x) ∈ ∆}, (1)
of states in Ω for which the proposition that the system has this property is
true. Thus dynamical properties are associated with subsets of the space of
6 This presentation of the structure of properties in classical physics was inspired
by Isham (1995).
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states Ω, and we have the one-to-one correspondence mentioned above between
properties and points in the state space now as follows: A(x) ∈ ∆⇔ x ∈ ΩA∈∆.
Furthermore, the logical structure of the propositions about the dynamical
properties of the system is identified with the Boolean σ-algebra B of subsets
of the space of states Ω. This encodes the normal logical way (i.e., Boolean
logic) of dealing with propositions about properties 7 .
In order to address holism we need to be able to speak about properties of
composite systems in terms of properties of the subsystems. The first I will
call global properties, the second local properties 8 . It is a crucial and almost
defining feature of the state space of classical physics that the local dynam-
ical properties suffice for inferring all global dynamical properties. This is
formalised as follows. Consider the simplest case of a composite system with
two subsystems (labeled 1 and 2). Let the tuple < Ω12,B12 > characterize the
state space of the composite system and the Boolean σ-algebra of subsets of
that state space. The latter is isomorphic to the logic of propositions about
the global properties. This tuple is determined by the subsystems in the fol-
lowing way. Given the tuples < Ω1,B1 > and < Ω2,B2 > that characterize the
subsystem state spaces and property structures, Ω12 is the Cartesian product
space of Ω1 and Ω2, i.e.,
Ω12 = Ω1 × Ω2, (2)
and furthermore,
B12 = A(B1,B2), (3)
where A(B1,B2) is the smallest σ-algebra generated by σ-algebras that contain
Cartesian products as elements. This algebra is defined by the following three
properties (Halmos, 1988): (i) if A1 ∈ B1, A2 ∈ B2 then A1×A2 ∈ A(B1,B2),
(ii) it is closed under countable conjunction, disjunction and taking differ-
ences, (iii) it is the smallest one generated in this way. The σ-algebra B12 thus
contains by definition all sets that can be written as a countable conjunction
of Cartesian product sets such as Λ1 × Λ2 ⊂ Ω12 (with Λ1 ⊂ Ω1, Λ2 ⊂ Ω2),
also called rectangles.
7 The relation of conjunction of propositions corresponds to the set-theoretical in-
tersection (of subsets of the state space), that of entailment between propositions to
the set-theoretical inclusion, that of negation of a proposition to the set-theoretical
complement and finally that of disjunction of propositions corresponds to the set-
theoretical union. In classical physics the (countable) logic of propositions about
properties is thus isomorphic to a Boolean σ-algebra of subsets of the state space.
8 Note that local has here nothing to do with the issue of locality or spatial sepa-
ration. It is taken to be opposed to global, i.e., restricted to a subsystem.
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The above means that the Boolean σ-algebra of the properties of the com-
posite system is in fact the product algebra of the subsystem algebras. Thus
propositions about global properties (e.g., global quantity B having a certain
value) can be written as disjunctions of propositions which are conjunctions of
propositions about local properties alone (e.g., subsystem quantities A1 and
A2 having certain values). In other words, the truth value of all propositions
about B can be determined from the truth value of disjunctions of properties
about A1 and A2. The first and the latter thus have the same extension.
On the phase space Ω12 all this gives rise to the following structure. To the
property that the value of B of a composite system lies in ∆ there is associated
a Borel-measurable subset of Ω12, for which the proposition that the system
has this property is true:
{(x1, x2) ∈ Ω12| B(x1, x2) ∈ ∆} ∈ B12, (4)
where (x1, x2) are the pure states (i.e., points) in the phase space of the com-
posite system and x1 and x2 are the subsystem states that each lie in the state
space Ω1 or Ω2 of the respective subsystem. The important thing to note is
that this subset lies in the product algebra B12 and therefore is determined by
the subsystem algebras B1 and B2 via Eq. (3).
From the above we conclude, and so is concluded in the supervenience ap-
proaches mentioned in the Introduction, although on other non-formal grounds,
that classical physics is not holistic. For the global properties supervene on
the local ones because the Boolean algebra structure of the global properties
is determined by the Boolean algebra structures of the local ones. Thus all
quantities pertaining to the global properties defined on the composite phase
space such as B(x1, x2) are supervening quantities.
For concreteness consider two examples of such supervening quantities B(x1, x2)
of a composite system. The first is q =‖ ~q1 − ~q2 ‖ which gives us the global
property of a system that specifies the distance between two subsystems. The
second is
−→
F = −~∇V (‖ ~q1− ~q2 ‖) which gives us the property of a system that
says how strong the force is between its subsystems arising from the potential
V . This could for example be the potential m1m2G‖~q1−~q2‖ for the Newtonian gravity
force. Although both examples are highly non-local and could involve action
at a distance, no holism is involved since the global properties supervene on
the local ones. As Teller (1986, p.76) puts it: ‘Neither action at a distance
nor distant spatial separation threaten to enter the picture to spoil the idea
of the world working as a giant mechanism, understandable in terms of the
individual parts.’
Some words about the issue of whether spatial relations are to be considered
holistic, are in order here. Although the spatial relation of relative distance
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of the whole indicates the way in which the parts are related with respect
to position, whereby it is not the case that each of the parts has a position
independent of the other one, it is here nevertheless not regarded a holistic
property since it is supervening on spatial position. We have seen that the
distance q between two systems is treated supervenient on the systems having
positions ~q1 and ~q2 in the sense expressed by Eq. (4). However, the argumen-
tation given here requires an absolutist account of space so that position can
be regarded as an intrinsic property of a system. But one can deny this and
adopt a relational account of space and then spatial relations become monadic
and positions become derivative, which has the consequence that one has to
incorporate spatial relations in the supervenience basis 9 .
On an absolutist account of space the spatial relation of relative distance be-
tween the parts of a whole is shown to be supervenient upon local properties,
and it is thus not to be included in the supervenience basis 10 . A relation-
ist account, however, does include the spatial relations in the supervenience
basis. The reason is that on this account they are to be regarded as intrinsi-
cally relational, and therefore non-supervening on the subsystem properties.
Cleland (1984) and French (1989) for example argue spatial relations to be
non-supervening relations. Furthermore, some hold that all other intrinsic re-
lations can be regarded to be supervenient upon these. The intuition is that
wholes seem to be built out of their parts if arranged in the right spatial rela-
tions, and these spatial relations are taken to be in some sense monadic and
therefore not holistic 11 .
Thus we see that issues depend on what view one has about the nature of space
(or space-time). Here I will not argue for any position, but merely note that
if one takes an absolutist stance towards space so that bodies are considered
to have a particular position, then spatial relations can be considered to be
supervening on the positions of the relata in the manner indicated by the
decomposition of Eq. (4). This discussion about whether spatial relations are
to be regarded as properties that should be included in the supervenience basis
clearly indicates that the supervenience criterion must be relativized to the
supervenience basis. As we will see later on this is analogous to the fact that
9 A more subtle example than the relative distance between two points would be
the question whether or not the relative angle between two directions at different
points in space is a supervening property, i.e., whether or not the relative angle is
to be considered holistic or not. This depends on whether or not one can consider
local orientations as properties that are to be included in the supervenience basis.
10 Teller (1987) for example takes spatial relations to be supervening on intrinsic
physical properties since for him the latter include spatiotemporal properties.
11 Healey (1991, p.409) phrases this as follows: ‘Spatial relations are of special sig-
nificance because they seem to yield the only clear example of qualitative, intrinsic
relations required in the supervenience basis in addition to the qualitative intrinsic
properties of the relata. Other intrinsic relations supervene on spatial relations.’
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the epistemological criterion proposed here work must be relativized to the
resource basis.
As a final note in this section, I mention that because of the one-to-one cor-
respondence in classical physics between physical quantities on the one hand
and states on the state space on the other hand, and because composite states
are uniquely determined by subsystem states (as can be seen from Eq.(2)), it
suffices to consider the state space of a system to answer the question whether
or not some theory is holistic. The supervenience basis is thus determined by
the state space (supplemented with the fixed properties). However, this is a
special case and it contrasts with the quantum mechanical case (as will be
shown in the next subsection). The supervenience approach should take this
into account. Nevertheless, the supervenience approach mostly limits itself to
the quantum mechanical state space in determining whether or not quantum
mechanics is holistic. The epistemological approach to be developed here uses
also other relevant features of the formalism, such as property determination,
and focuses therefore primarily on the structure of the assigned properties and
not on that of the state space. This will be discussed in the following sections.
2.2 Quantum physics in the supervenience approach
In this section I will first treat some general aspects of the quantum mechanical
formalism before discussing how the supervenience approach deals with this
theory.
In quantum mechanics, just as in classical physics, systems are assigned two
kinds of properties. On the one hand, the fixed properties that we find in
classical physics supplemented with some new ones such as intrinsic spin. On
the other hand, dynamical properties such as components of spin (Healey,
1991). These dynamical properties are, again just as in classical physics, de-
termined in a certain way by values observables have when the system is in
a particular state. However, the state space and observables are represented
quite differently from what we have already seen in classical physics. In gen-
eral, a quantum state does not correspond uniquely to the outcomes of the
measurements that can be performed on the system. Instead, the system is
assigned a specific Hilbert space H as its state space and the physical state of
the system is represented by a state vector |ψ〉 in the pure case and a density
operator ρ in the mixed case. Any physical quantity A is represented by an
observable or self-adjoint operator Aˆ. Furthermore, the spectrum of Aˆ is the
set of possible values the quantity A can have upon measurement.
The pure state |ψ〉 can be considered to assign a probability distribution
pi = | 〈ψ| i〉|2 to an orthonormal set of states { | i〉 }. In the case where one of
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the states is the vector |ψ〉, it is completely concentrated onto this vector. The
state |ψ〉 can thus be regarded as the analogon of a δ-distribution on the classi-
cal phase space Ω, as used in statistical physics. However the radical difference
is that the pure quantum states do not (in general) form an orthonormal set.
This implies that the pure state |ψ〉 will also assign a positive probability to
a different state |φ〉 if they are non-orthogonal and thus have overlap. This
is contrary to the classical case, where the pure state δ(q − q0, p − p0) con-
centrated on (p0, q0) ∈ Ω will always give rise to a probability distribution
that assigns probability zero to every other pure state, since pure states on
Ω cannot have overlap. Furthermore, the probability that the value of an ob-
servable Bˆ lies in the real interval X when the system is in the quantum state
ρ is Tr (ρPBˆ,X) where PBˆ,X is the projector associated to the pair (Bˆ, X) by
the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators. This probability is in general
not concentrated in {0, 1} even when ρ is a pure state. Only in the special
case that the state is an eigenstate of the observable Bˆ is it concentrated in
{0, 1}, and the system is assigned the corresponding eigenvalue with certainty.
From this we see that there is no one-to-one correspondence between values
an observable can obtain and states of the quantum system.
Because of this failure of a one-to-one correspondence there are interpretations
of quantum mechanics that postulate different connections between the state
of the system and the dynamical properties it possesses. Whereas in classical
physics this was taken to be unproblematic and natural, in quantum mechan-
ics it turns out to be problematic and non-trivial. But a connection must be
given in order to ask about any holism, since we have to be able to speak about
possessed properties and thus an interpretation that gives us a property as-
signment rule is necessary. Here I will consider the well-known orthodox inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics that uses the so called eigenstate-eigenvalue
link for this connection: a physical system has the property that quantity A
has a particular value if and only if its state is an eigenstate of the operator Aˆ
corresponding to A. This value is the eigenvalue associated with the particu-
lar eigenvector. Furthermore, in the orthodox interpretation measurements are
taken to be ideal von Neumann measurements, whereby upon measurement
the system is projected into an eigenstate of the observable being measured
and the value found is the eigenvalue corresponding to that particular eigen-
state. The probability for this eigenvalue to occur is given by the well-known
Born rule 〈 i| ρ | i〉, with | i〉 the eigenstate that is projected upon and ρ the
state of the system before measurement. Systems thus have properties only
if they are in an eigenstate of the corresponding observables, i.e., the system
either already is or must first be projected into such an eigenstate by the pro-
cess of measurement. We thus see that the epistemological scheme of how we
gain knowledge of properties, i.e., the measurement process described above,
serves also as an ontological one defining what properties of a system can be
regarded to exist at a given time at all.
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Let me now go back to the supervenience approach to holism and ask what it
says about quantum mechanics in the orthodox interpretation stated above.
According to all proponents of this approach mentioned in the Introduction
quantum mechanics is holistic. The reason for this is supposed to be the fea-
ture of entanglement, a feature absent in classical physics. In order to discuss
the argument used, let me first present some aspects of entanglement. Entan-
glement is a property of composite quantum systems whereby the state of the
system cannot be derived from any combination of the subsystem states. It is
due to the tensor product structure of a composite Hilbert space and the lin-
ear superposition principle of quantum mechanics. In the simplest case of two
subsystems, the precise definition is that the composite state ρ cannot be writ-
ten as a convex sum of products of single particle states, i.e., ρ 6= ∑i piρ1i ⊗ρ2i ,
with pi ∈ [0, 1] and ∑i pi = 1. In the pure case, an entangled state is one that
cannot be written as a product of single particle states. Examples include the
so-called Bell states |ψ−〉 and |φ−〉 of a spin-1/2 particle. These states can be
written as
∣∣∣ψ−
〉
=
1√
2
(| 01〉z − | 10〉z),
∣∣∣ φ−
〉
=
1√
2
(| 00〉z − | 11〉z), (5)
with | 0〉z and | 1〉z eigenstates of the spin operator Sˆz = ~2 σˆz, i.e., the spin up
and down state in the z-direction respectively. These Bell states are eigenstates
for total spin of the composite system given by the observable Sˆ2 = (Sˆ1+ Sˆ2)
2
with eigenvalue 0 and 2~2 respectively.
According to the orthodox interpretation, if the composite system is in one of
the states of Eq. (5), the system possesses one of two global properties for total
spin which are completely different, namely eigenvalue 0 and eigenvalue 2~2.
The question now is whether or not this spin property is holistic, i.e., does it or
does it not supervene on subsystem properties? According to the supervenience
approach it does not and the argument goes as follows. Since the individual
subsystems have the same reduced state, namely the completely mixed state
1
2
1, and because these are not eigenstates of any spin observable, no spin prop-
erty at all can be assigned to them. So there is a difference in global properties
to which no difference in the local properties of the subsystems corresponds.
Therefore there is no supervenience and we have an instantiation of holism 12 .
It is the feature of entanglement in this example that is held responsible for
holism. Maudlin (1998) even defines holism in quantum mechanics in terms of
entanglement and Esfeld (2001, p.205) puts it as follows: ‘The entanglement
of two or more states is the basis for the discussion on holism in quantum
12 This is the exact argument Maudlin (1998) uses. Healey (1991) and Esfeld (2001)
also use an entangled spin example whereas Teller (1986, 1989), French (1989) and
Howard (1989) use different entangled states or some consequence of entanglement
such as violation of the bipartite Bell inequalities.
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physics.’ Also French (1989, p.11), although using a different approach to su-
pervenience (see footnote 4), shares this view: ‘Since the state function [...] is
not a product of the separate state functions of the particles, one cannot [...]
ascribe to each particle an individual state function. It is this, of course, which
reveals the peculiar non-classical holism of quantum mechanics.’
I would now like to make an observation of a crucial aspect of the reasoning
the supervenience approach uses to conclude that quantum mechanics endorses
holism. In the above and also in other cases the issue is treated via the concept
of entanglement of quantum states. This, however, is a notion primarily tied to
the structure of the state space of quantum mechanics, i.e., the Hilbert space,
and not to the structure of the properties assigned in the interpretation in
question. There is no one-to-one correspondence between states and assigned
dynamical properties, contrary to what we have already seen in the classical
case. Thus questions in terms of states, such as ‘is the state entangled?’ and in
terms of properties such as ‘is there non-supervenience?’ are different in prin-
ciple. And although there is some connection via the property assignment rule
using the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, I claim them to be relevantly different.
Holism is a thesis about the structure of properties assigned to a whole and
to its parts, not a thesis about the state space of a theory. The supervenience
approach should carefully ensure that it takes this into account. However, the
epistemological approach of the next section naturally takes this into account
since it focuses directly on property determination. It probes the structure of
the assigned properties and not just that of the state space.
The reason that in the supervenience approach one immediately and solely
looks at the structure of the state space is because in its supervenience basis
only the properties the subsystems have in and out of themselves at the time in
question are regarded. This means that using the eigenstate-eigenvalue rule for
the dynamical properties one focuses on properties the system has in so far as
the state of the system implies them. Only eigenstates give rise to properties,
other states do not. A different approach, still in the orthodox interpretation,
would be to focus on properties the system can possess according to the possi-
ble property determinations quantum mechanics allows for. It is the structure
of the properties that can be possibly assigned at all, which is then at the
heart of our investigations. In this view one could say that the physical state
of a system is regarded more generally, as also Howard (1989) does, as a set of
dispositions for the system to manifest certain properties under certain (mea-
surement) circumstances, whereby the eigenstates are a special case assigning
properties with certainty. This view is the one underlying the epistemological
approach which will be proposed and worked out next.
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3 An epistemological criterion for holism in physical theories
Before presenting the new criterion for holism I would like to motivate it
by going back to the spin-1/2 example of the last section. Let us consider the
example, which according to the supervenience approach gives an instantiation
of holism, from a different point of view. Instead of solely considering state
descriptions, let us look at what physical processes can actually be performed
according to the theory in question in order to gain knowledge of the system.
I call this an epistemological stance. I will show next that it then is possible
to determine, using only non-holistic means (to be specified later on) whether
or not one is dealing with the Bell state |ψ−〉 or |φ−〉 of Eq. (5). How? First
measure on each subsystem the spin in the z-direction. Next, compare these
results using classical communication. If the results have the same parity, the
composite system was in the state |φ−〉 with global spin property 2~2. And
if the results do not have the same parity, the system was in the state |ψ−〉
with global spin property 0.
Thus using local measurements and classical communication the different
global properties can be inferred after all. There is no indication of holism in
this approach, which is different from what the supervenience approach told
us in the previous section. Although it remains true that the mixed reduced
states of the individual subsystems do not determine the composite state and
neither a local observable (of which there is no eigenstate), enough information
can be nevertheless gathered by local operations and classical communication
to infer the global property. We see that from an epistemological point of view
we should not get stuck on the fact that the subsystems themselves have no
spin property because they are not in an eigenstate of a spin observable. We
can assign them a state, and thus can perform measurements and assign them
some local properties, which in this case do determine the global property in
question.
From this example we see that this approach to holism does not merely look at
the state space of a theory, but focuses on the structure of properties assigned
to a whole and to its parts, as argued before that it should do. Then how
do we spot candidates for holism in this approach? Two elements are crucial.
Firstly, the theory must contain global properties that cannot be inferred from
the local properties assigned to the subsystems, while, secondly, we must take
into account non-holistic constraints on the determination of these properties.
These constraints are that we only use the resource basis available to local
agents (who each have access to one of the subsystems). The guiding intuition
is that using this resource basis will provide us with only non-holistic features
of the whole. From this we finally get the following criterion for holism in a
physical theory:
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A physical theory is holistic if and only if it is impossible in principle, for
a set of local agents each having access to a single subsystem only, to infer
the global properties of a system as assigned in the theory (which can be
inferred by global measurements), by using the resource basis available to
the agents.
Crucial is the specification of the resource basis. The idea is that these are
all non-holistic resources for property determination available to an agent.
However, just as in the case of the specification of the supervenience basis,
this basis probably cannot be uniquely specified, i.e., the exact content of the
basis is open to debate. Here I propose that these resources include at least all
local operations and classical communication (abbreviated as LOCC) 13 . The
motivation for this is the intuition that local operations, i.e., anything we do
on the separate subsystems, and classically communicating whatever we find
out about it, will only provide us with non-holistic properties of a composite
system. However it could be possible to include other, although more debat-
able, non-holistic resources. A good example of such a debatable resource we
have already seen: Namely, whether or not an agent can consider the position
of a subsystem as a property of the subsystem, so that he can calculate rela-
tive distances when he knows the fixed positions of other subsystems. Another
example is provided by the discussion of footnote 9 which suggests the ques-
tion whether or not an agent can use a shared Cartesian reference frame, or a
channel that transmits objects with well-defined orientations, as a resource for
determining the relative angle between directions at different points in space.
I believe that the determination of these and other spatial relations should
be nevertheless included in the resource basis, for I take these relations to
be (spatially) nonlocal, yet not holistic. Furthermore because we are dealing
with epistemology in specifying the resource basis, I do not think that includ-
ing them necessarily implies ontological commitment as to which view one
must endorse about space or space-time. Therefore, when discussing different
physical theories in the next section, I will use as the content of the resource
basis, firstly, the determination of spatial relations, and secondly LOCC (lo-
cal operations and classical communication). The latter can usually be un-
problematically formalized within physical theories and do not depend on for
example the view one has about spacetime. I thus propose to study the phys-
ical realizability of measuring or determining global properties while taking
as a constraint that one uses LOCC supplemented with the determination of
spatial relations.
Let me mention some aspects of this proposed approach before it is applied
13 Note again that local has here nothing to do with the issue of locality or spa-
tial separation, but that it is taken to be opposed to global, i.e., restricted to a
subsystem.
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in the next section. Firstly, it tries to formalize the question of holism in the
context of what modern physical theories are, taking them to be (i) schemes to
find out and predict what the results are of certain interventions, which can be
possibly used for determination of assigned properties, and (ii), although not
relevant here, possibly describing physical reality. Theories are no longer taken
to necessarily present us with an ontological picture of the world specified by
the properties of all things possessed at a given time.
Secondly, the approach treats the concept of property physically and not on-
tologically (or metaphysically). I mean by this that the concept is treated
analogous to the way Einstein treated space and time (as that what is given
by measuring rods and revolutions of clocks), namely as that which can be
attributed to a system when measuring it, or as that which determines the
outcomes of interventions.
Thirdly, by including classical communication, this approach considers the
possibility of determining some intrinsic relations among the parts such as
the parity of a pair of bits, as was seen in the previous spin-1/2 example. The
parts are considered as parts, i.e., as constituting a whole with other parts and
therefore being related to each other. But the idea is that they are nevertheless
considered non-holistically by using only the resource basis each agent has for
determining properties and relations of the parts.
Fourthly, as mentioned before, the epistemological criterion for holism is rela-
tivized to the resource basis. Note that this is analogous to the supervenience
criterion which is relativized to the supervenience basis. I believe this relativiz-
ing to be unavoidable and even desirable because it, reflects the ambiguity and
debatable aspect inherent in any discussion about holism. Yet, in this way it
is incorporated in a fair and clear way.
Lastly, note that the epistemological criterion is logically independent of the
supervenience criterion. Thus whether or not a theory is holistic in the super-
venience approach is independent of whether or not it is holistic in the newly
proposed epistemological approach. This is the case because not all intrinsic
properties and relations in the supervenience basis are necessarily accessible
using the resource basis, and conversely, some that are accessible using the
resource basis may not be included in the supervenience one 14 .
14Of the latter case an example was given using the spin 1/2 example, since the
property specifying whether the singlet state or the triplet state obtain is not su-
pervening, but can be inferred using only LOCC. Of the first case an example will
be given in the next section.
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4 Holism in classical physics and quantum mechanics; revisited.
In this section I will apply the epistemological criterion for holism to differ-
ent physical theories, where I use as the content of the resource basis the
determination of spatial relations supplemented with LOCC.
4.1 Classical Physics and Bohmian Mechanics
In section 2.1 classical physics on a phase space was deemed non-holistic in the
supervenience approach because global properties in this theory were argued
to be supervening on subsystem properties. Using the epistemological criterion
we again find that classical physics is deemed non-holistic 15 . The reason is
that because of the one-to-one relationship between properties and the state
space and the fact that a Cartesian product is used for combining subsystem
state spaces, and because measurement in classical physics is unproblematic
as a property determining process, the resource basis allows for determination
of all subsystem properties. We thus are able to infer the Boolean σ-algebra
of the properties of the subsystems. Finally, given this the global properties
can be inferred from the local ones (see section 2.1), because the Boolean
algebra structure of the global properties is determined by the Boolean algebra
structures of the local ones, as was given in Eq. (3). Hence no epistemological
holism can be found.
Another interesting theory that also uses a state space with a Cartesian prod-
uct to combine state spaces of subsystems is Bohmian mechanics (see e.g.
Du¨rr, Goldstein, & Zangh`i (1996)). It is not a phase space but a configura-
tion space. This theory has an ontology of particles with well defined positions
on trajectories 16 . Here I discuss the interpretation where this theory is sup-
plemented with a property assignment rule just as in classical physics (i.e., all
functions on the state space correspond to possible properties that can all be
measured). Indeed, pure physical states of a system are given by single points
(~q) of the position variables ~q that together make up a configuration space.
There is a one-to-one relationship between the set of properties a system has
15 Note that in both cases only systems with finite many subsystems are considered.
16 Bohmian mechanics, which has as ontologically existing only particles with well
defined positions on trajectories, should be distinguished (although this is perhaps
not common practice) from the so-called the de Broglie-Bohm theory where besides
particles also the wave function has ontological existence as a guiding field. This
contrasts with Bohmian mechanics since in this theory the wave function has only
nomological existence. Whether or not de Broglie-Bohm theory is holistic because
of the different role assigned to the wave function needs careful examination, which
will here not be executed.
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and the state on the configuration space it is in, as was shown in section 2.1.
The dynamics is given by the possibly non-local quantum potential UQM(~q)
determined by the quantum mechanical state |ψ〉, supplemented with the or-
dinary classical potential V (~q), such that the force on a particle is given by:
~F ≡ d~p
dt
= −~∇[V (~q) + UQM(~q)]. This theory can be considered to be a real
mechanics, i.e., a Hamilton-Jacobi theory, although with a specific extra inter-
action term. This is the quantum potential in which the wave function appears
that has only nomological existence. (Although a Hamilton-Jacobi theory, it is
not classical mechanics: the latter is a second order theory, whereas Bohmian
mechanics is of first order, i.e., velocity is not independent of position).
In section 2.1 all theories on a state space with a Cartesian product to com-
bine subsystem state spaces and using a property assignment rule just as in
classical physics were deemed non-holistic by the supervenience approach and
therefore we can conclude that Bohmian mechanics is non-holistic in this ap-
proach. Perhaps not surprising, but the epistemological approach also deems
this theory non-holistic. The reason why is the same as why classical physics
as formulated on a phase space was argued above to be not holistic in this
approach.
Because Bohmian mechanics and quantum mechanics in the orthodox inter-
pretation have the same empirical content, one might think that because the
first is not holistic, neither is the latter. However, this is not the case, as will
be shown next. This illustrates the fact that an interpretation of a theory, in
so far as a property assignment rule is to be given, is crucial for the question
of holism. A formalism on its own is not enough.
4.2 Quantum Operations and Holism
In this section I will show that quantum mechanics in the orthodox interpre-
tation is holistic using the epistemological criterion, without using the feature
of entanglement. In order to do this we need to specify what the resource basis
looks like in this theory. Thus we need to formalize what a local operation is
and what is meant by classical communication in the context of quantum me-
chanics. For the argument it is not necessary to deal with the determination
of spatial relations and these will thus not be considered.
Let us first look at a general quantum process S that takes a state ρ of a
system on a certain Hilbert space H1 to a different state σ on a possibly
different Hilbert space H2, i.e.,
ρ→ σ = S(ρ), ρ ∈ H1, S(ρ) ∈ H2, (6)
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where S : H1 → H2 is a completely positive trace-nonincreasing map. This is
an operator S, positive and trace non-increasing, acting linearly on Hermitian
matrices such that S ⊗ 1 takes states to states. These maps are also called
quantum operations 17 . Any quantum process, such as for example unitary
evolution or measurement, can be represented by such a quantum operation.
We are now in the position to specify the class of LOCC operations. It is the
class of local operations plus two-way classical communication. It consists of
compositions of elementary operations of the following two forms
SA ⊗ 1, 1⊗ SB, (7)
with SA and SB arbitrary local quantum operations. The class contains the
identity and is closed under composition and taking tensor products. As an
example consider the case where A performs a measurement and communicates
her result α to B, after which B performs his measurement:
SAB(ρ) = (1⊗ SBα ) ◦ (SA ⊗ 1)(ρ). (8)
We see that B can condition his measurement on the outcome that A obtained.
This example can be extended to many such rounds in which A and B each
perform certain local operations on their part of the system and condition
their choices on what is communicated to them.
Suppose now that we have a physical quantity R of a bi-partite system with
a corresponding operator Rˆ that has a set of nine eigenstates, |ψ1〉 to |ψ9〉,
with eigenvalues 1 to 9. The property assignment we consider is the following:
if the system is in an eigenstate |ψi〉 then it has the property that quantity R
has the fixed value i (this is the eigenstate-eigenvalue link). Suppose Rˆ works
on H = HA ⊗ HB (each three dimensions) and has the following complete
orthonormal set of non-entangled eigenstates:
|ψ1〉= | 1〉 ⊗ | 1〉 ,
|ψ2,3〉= | 0〉 ⊗ | 0± 1〉 ,
|ψ4,5〉= | 2〉 ⊗ | 1± 2〉 ,
|ψ6,7〉= | 1± 2〉 ⊗ | 0〉 ,
|ψ8,9〉= | 0± 1〉 ⊗ | 2〉 , (9)
with | 0 + 1〉 = 1√
2
(| 0〉+ | 1〉), etc.
17 See Nielsen & Chuang (2000) for an introduction to the general formalism of
quantum operations.
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We want to infer whether the composite system has the property that the
value of the observable R is one of the numbers 1 to 9, using only LOCC
operations performed by two observers A and B, who each have one of the
individual subsystems. Because the eigenstate-eigenvalue link is the property
assignment rule used here, this amounts to determining which eigenstate A
and B have or project on during the LOCC measurement. If A and B project
on eigenstate |ψi〉 then a quantum operation Si : ρ → Si(ρ)Tr[Si(ρ)] is associated
to the measurement outcome i, with projection operators Si = | i〉A | i〉B 〈ψi|.
This is nothing but the well-known projection due to measurement (with ad-
ditional renormalisation), but here written in the language of local quantum
operations 18 . The state | i〉A denotes the classical record of the outcome of
the measurement that A writes down, and similarly for | i〉B. These records
can be considered to be local properties of the subsystems A and B.
It follows from the theory of quantum operations (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000)
that implementing the quantum operation S(ρ) = ∑i SiρS†i amounts to deter-
mining the global property assignment given by Rˆ. Surprisingly, this cannot be
done using LOCC, a result obtained by Bennett et al. (1999). For the complete
proof see the original article by Bennett et al. (1999) or Walgate & Hardy
(2002) 19 , but a sketch of it goes as follows. If A or B perform von Neumann
measurements in any of their operation and communication rounds then the
distinguishability of the states is spoiled. Spoiling occurs in any local basis.
The ensemble of states as seen by A or by B alone is therefore non-orthogonal,
although the composite states are in fact orthogonal.
From this we see that a physical quantity, whose corresponding operator has
only product eigenstates, gives a property assignment using the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link that is not measurable using LOCC. Furthermore, we see that
the resource basis sketched before does not suffice in determining the global
property assignment given by Rˆ. Thus according to the epistemological cri-
terion of the previous section quantum mechanics is holistic, although no en-
tanglement is involved. Examples of epistemological holism that do involve
entanglement can of course be given. For example, distinguishing the four (en-
tangled) Bell states given by |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉 and |φ−〉 (see Eq.(5)) cannot
be done by LOCC. Thus entanglement is sufficient to prove epistemological
holism. However, this is hardly surprising. What is surprising is the fact that
18 Instead of writing the projection operators as Si = |ψi〉 〈ψi|, I write Si =
| i〉A | i〉B 〈ψi| to show explicitly that only local records are taken. Since the states | i〉
can be regarded eigenstates of some local observable, we can regard them to deter-
mine a local property using the property assignment rule in terms of the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link of the orthodox interpretation.
19 This result is a special case of the fact that some family of separable quantum
operations (that all have a complete eigenbasis of separable states) cannot be imple-
mented by LOCC and von Neumann measurements. This is proven by Chen & Li
(2003).
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it is not necessary, i.e., that here a proof of epistemological holism is given not
involving entanglement. Furthermore because of the lack of entanglement in
this example it would not allow for a proof of holism in the supervenience ap-
proach. Of course, it may well be that the resource basis used in this example
is too limited, but I do not see other resources that may sensibly be included
in this basis so as to render this example epistemologically non-holistic.
5 Conclusion and outlook
I sketched an epistemological criterion for holism that determines, once the
resource basis has been specified, whether or not a physical theory with a
property assignment rule is holistic. It was argued to be a suitable one for
addressing holism in physical theories, because it focuses on property deter-
mination as specified by the physical theory in question (possibly equipped
with a property assignment rule via an interpretation). I distinguished this
criterion from the well-known supervenience criterion for holism and showed
them to be logically independent. Furthermore, it was shown that both the
epistemological and the supervenience approaches require relativizing the cri-
teria to respectively the resource basis and the supervenience basis. I argued
that in general neither of these bases is determined by the state space of a
physical theory. In other words, holism is not a thesis about the state space a
theory uses, it is about the structure of properties and property assignments
to a whole and its parts that a theory or an interpretation allows for. And in
investigating what it allows for we need to try to formalize what we intuitively
think of as holistic and non-holistic. Here, I hope to have given a satisfactory
new epistemological formulation of this, that allows one to go out into the
world of physics and apply the new criterion to the theories or interpretations
one encounters.
In this paper I have only treated some specific physical theories. It was shown
that all theories on a state space using a Cartesian product to combine sub-
system state spaces, such as classical physics and Bohmian mechanics, are
not holistic in both the supervenience and epistemological approach. The rea-
son for this is that the Boolean algebra structure of the global properties is
determined by the Boolean algebra structures of the local ones. The ortho-
dox interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, was found to instantiate
holism. This holds in both approaches, although on different grounds. For the
supervenience approach it is the feature of entanglement that leads to holism,
whereas using only LOCC resources, one can have epistemological holism in
absence of any entanglement, i.e., when there is no holism according to the
supervenience approach.
There are of course many open problems left. What is it that we can single
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out to be the reason of the holism found? The use of a Hilbert space with its
feature of superposition? Perhaps, but not the kind of superposition that gives
rise to entanglement, for I have argued that it is not entanglement that we
should per se consider to be the paradigmatic example of holism. Should we
blame the property assignment rule which the orthodox interpretation uses?
I shall leave this an open problem.
The entangled Bell states |ψ−〉 and | φ−〉 of section 2.2 could, despite their
entanglement, be distinguished after all using only LOCC, whereas this was
not possible in the set of nine (non-entangled) product states of Eq.(9). These
two quantum mechanical examples show us that we can do both more and
less than quantum states at first seem to tell us. This is an insight gained
from the new field of quantum information theory. Its focus on what one can
or cannot do do with quantum systems, although often from an engineering
point of view, has produced a new and powerful way of dealing with questions
in the foundations of quantum mechanics that can lead to fundamental new
insights or principles. I hope the new criterion for holism in physical theories
suggested in this paper is an inspiring example of this.
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